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INTRODUCTION 
Words hurt—and your boss has feelings too.  Criticism of a 
company’s products, services, management, or labor practices is never 
good for business.  But when the attacker is an employee, trained and 
paid to work towards the firm’s prosperity, his words can cut deeper 
than the bottom line.  The employer may feel betrayed and amply 
justified in firing such an ‘ungrateful’ or ‘disloyal’ employee. 
But this sentiment might elicit little sympathy from the single 
parent who, unable to find cover the day a child is sick, wants to 
speak out against a company policy of firing all absentees, or from the 
long-serving employee whose co-workers are thoughtlessly fired in a 
downturn.  These workers feel they have a right to express their 
concerns, and that the public has a right to hear them. 
Both perspectives are valid.  Each has a place in the nation’s labor 
law.  On the one hand, most employees in the United States are 
employees at-will, meaning they can be fired for any reason or for 
none at all,1 and courts have found a duty on the worker’s part to 
refrain from harming his employer’s interests.2  An employer is not 
obliged to pay unwanted or unnecessary workers.  On the other hand, 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. See generally Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984). 
 2. See generally Matthew W. Finkin, Disloyalty! Does Jefferson Standard Stalk 
Still?, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 541 (2007). 
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the National Labor Relations Act3 (“NLRA” or “the Act”) protects a 
worker’s efforts to better her conditions of employment,4 and this 
includes working against the employer’s interests by forming unions,5 
organizing strikes,6 or appealing to third parties for support in a 
dispute.7  An employer commits an unfair labor practice when it fires 
an employee for engaging in conduct covered by the Act.8 
These features of U.S. Labor Law can coexist, however uneasily.  
Activity that is protected by the NLRA cannot justify a worker’s 
termination; any unprotected activity can.  But the National Labor 
Relations Board (“NLRB” or “the Board”) and Federal Courts of 
Appeals have recognized a third class of activity: conduct otherwise 
protected by the Act may nonetheless be grounds (or “cause”)9 for 
termination if it is deemed to be ‘disloyal.’10  Both the Board and the 
courts have struggled to define the scope of this class, as illustrated by 
a recent split between the Eighth and D.C. Circuits on the issue.11 
This Note addresses the problems caused by the disloyalty 
exception to section 7 of the NLRA and argues that the exception can 
and should be abandoned.  Part I introduces the National Labor 
Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Board, discusses the 
Act’s conflicting policies and provisions, and presents the Supreme 
Court decision that gave birth to the disloyalty exception: Jefferson 
Standard.12  Part II traces the Board’s struggle to formulate an 
objective test for disloyalty amenable to consistent application, and 
explores criticisms of the exception as subjective, indeterminate, 
outdated, and fundamentally inconsistent with the Act.  Finally, Part 
III argues that the true problem lies with the Board’s failure to 
choose between conflicting theories of the Act’s policy in light of the 
Taft-Hartley Amendments.  It suggests that the Board recognizes the 
difficulties inherent in the disloyalty exception but feels bound by 
                                                                                                                                         
 3. See generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012). See 
also National Labor Relations Act, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD. [hereinafter 
NLRA Overview], https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/national-labor-relations-act 
[https://perma.cc/8W7J-VX6W]. 
 4. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 566–67 (1978). 
 8. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4). 
 9. Id. § 160. 
 10. NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Intern. Broth. of Elec. Workers (Jefferson 
Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 472, 474 (1953). 
 11. Compare DirecTV, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 25, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2016), with 
MikLin Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 861 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 12. See generally Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. 464. 
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Jefferson Standard to retain the doctrine in some form.  Part III 
asserts that the Board is in fact free to create its own test and goes on 
to offer an approach that would respond to both the problems with 
the present doctrine and the concerns of the Jefferson Standard 
Court. 
I.  THE NLRA, THE NLRB, AND JEFFERSON STANDARD 
Part I describes labor relations in the United States prior to 
passage of the NLRA.  This part considers the effects on working 
conditions of the ‘employment-at-will’ doctrine and lays out the key 
protections of the Act.  Part I next explores the Supreme Court’s 
decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.13 and Congress’ 
passage of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments, as well as the 
influence of both developments on Justice Burton’s opinion for the 
Court in Jefferson Standard and on subsequent interpretations of that 
case. 
A. Freedom of Contract and Employment At-Will 
When Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 
the legal landscape was bleak for the American worker.  Under the 
dominant freedom of contract doctrine all interference in employer-
employee relations was viewed, at best, as inefficient, and at worst as 
a denial of each party’s God-given right to dispose of his labor or 
capital as he wished.14 
Freedom of contract shaped labor law in at least two ways.  First, it 
provided a tool with which pro-industry judges could strike down laws 
passed for the common good on the grounds that they 
unconstitutionally regulated agreement—most famously in Lochner v. 
New York.15  Second, it served to justify the American ‘at-will’ 
employment regime.16  Under this system, according to the Supreme 
Court of Tennessee in 1884: 
[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they 
please, and to discharge or retain employees at will for good cause 
or for no cause, or even for bad cause without thereby being guilty 
                                                                                                                                         
 13. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 14. STEPHEN F. BEFORT & JOHN W. BUDD, INVISIBLE HANDS, INVISIBLE 
OBJECTIVES 87 (2009). 
 15. 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (striking down a New York worker-protection statute 
on the grounds that it “interferes with the right of contract between the employer and 
employees, concerning the number of hours in which the latter may labor in the 
bakery of the employer”). 
 16. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 953–56. 
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of an unlawful act per se.  It is a right which an employee may 
exercise in the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause or 
want of cause as the employer.17 
But the at-will system was not as even-handed as the court implies.  
While the law imposed few duties on employers, courts did find a 
duty on the worker’s part to “do nothing to injure his Master’s 
Business.”18  This vague duty, which has been described as “a basic 
obligation of faithfulness to the master’s interests,”19 was used to 
support “just cause” discharge of workers who had violated neither 
the law nor the terms of their employment contracts.20  Even 
contracted workers, then, could find themselves without protection 
when they acted to further their own vital interests—if furthering 
such interests came at the expense of the employer’s. 
In an environment hostile to regulation, meanwhile, wages and 
conditions were determined by the market.21  Here, employers held 
the cards.  Incorporation allowed consumers of labor to band together 
and bargain as a unit, while labor bid down its own wages in a 
scramble for work, of any kind, at any price.22  Workers who tried to 
organize were fired (or worse),23 and were without recourse under the 
at-will doctrine.  The results were predictable: dangerous conditions, 
low pay, and long hours.24  Discontent fostered unrest and, ultimately, 
                                                                                                                                         
 17. Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 518–19 (Tenn. 1884). 
 18. WILLIAM CAMPBELL, 1 FRASER ON MASTER AND SERVANT, EMPLOYER AND 
WORKMAN, AND MASTER AND APPRENTICE 88 (3d ed. 1882) (italics omitted). 
 19. Finkin, supra note 2, at 549. 
 20. See, e.g., Lacy v. Osbaldiston, 8 C & P 83, 173 ER 408 (1837). 
 21. See generally Daniel J. Chepaitis, The National Labor Relations Act, Non-
Paralleled Competition, and Market Power, 85 CAL. L. REV. 769 (1997) (arguing that 
the corporation is a form of employer concerted activity and defending the NLRA as 
necessary to correct that one-sided exercise of price-distorting market power). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Kenneth M. Casebeer, Labor Struggles, Collective Action, and Law, in 
AMERICAN LABOR STRUGGLES AND LAW HISTORIES 1, 8 (Kenneth M. Casebeer ed., 
2d ed. 2017) (The law “authorized permanent discharge and replacement of strikers, 
[and] criminal and civil conspiracy convictions [were] sustained by courts at all levels 
through sweeping injunctions prohibiting labor activity . . . .”). 
 24. See BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 14, at 29 (“[I]n the early 1900s, the average 
unskilled worker who earned $10 a week could barely afford a run-down, two-room 
apartment without running water.  By one count, industrial accidents resulted in 
25,000 deaths, 25,000 permanent disability cases, and 2 million temporary disability 
cases per year.  If these numbers are accurate, then there were more U.S. casualties 
in the workplace than on the battlefield during World War I.  A 1909 government 
survey revealed that 85 percent of wage earners typically worked at least fifty-four 
hours per week . . . .”). 
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industrial strife; strikes plagued the early twentieth-century 
workplace.25 
B. The National Labor Relations Act 
Senator Robert Wagner, author of the first version of the NLRA 
(“the Wagner Act”),26 hoped by the legislation to promote industrial 
peace through “industrial democracy.”27  Although the Wagner Act 
pursued several different policies,28 Congress enacted the NLRA “to 
protect the rights of employees and employers, to encourage 
collective bargaining, and to curtail certain private sector labor and 
management practices, which can harm the general welfare of 
workers, businesses and the U.S. economy.”29  Section 7 of the 
NLRA, “the essence of the entire statute,”30 grants employees the 
right to unionize, to strike, and to bargain collectively for mutual aid 
and protection.31  Section 10(c) empowers the Board to remedy 
employer action violating employees’ section 7 rights.32  That same 
section, however, prohibits the Board from ordering reinstatement of 
any employee terminated “for cause.”33 
                                                                                                                                         
 25. See S. REP. NO. 74-573 at 1–2 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, 2301 (1985) (“In 1933 
over 812,137 workers were drawn into strikes, and in 1934 the number rose to 
1,277,344.  In this 2-year period over 32,000,000 working-days were lost because of 
labor controversies.”). 
 26. See The 1935 Passage of the Wagner Act, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., 
https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/1935-passage-wagner-act 
[https://perma.cc/ZZ5Z-C89E]. 
 27. 79 CONG. REC. S7568 (daily ed. May 15, 1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner). 
 28. See Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 
26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223, 230 (2005) (“The NLRA’s policies include 
promoting collective bargaining; safeguarding workers’ full freedom of association, 
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing; acting for 
mutual aid or protection; achieving equality of bargaining power; protecting the right 
to strike; preventing business depressions; improving wage rates; increasing the 
purchasing power of wage earners; and stabilizing competitive wage rates and 
working conditions within and between industries.”). 
 29. See NLRA Overview, supra note 3. 
 30. Charles J. Morris, How the National Labor Relations Act Was Stolen and 
How It Can Be Recovered: Taft-Hartley Revisionism and the National Labor 
Relations Board’s Appointment Process, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 16 
(2012). 
 31. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, 
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for 
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .”). 
 32. 29 U.S.C. § 160. 
 33. Id. 
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Section 3 of the Act establishes and governs the procedures of the 
National Labor Relations Board.34  The Board, an independent 
federal agency charged with enforcing the Act,35 determines national 
labor relations policy—within the limits set by Congress.36  The Board 
is composed of five members, appointed to five-year terms by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate.37 
The NLRB is responsible for investigating unfair labor practice 
allegations, finding relevant facts, and adjudicating such complaints in 
the first instance.  Board orders are not self-enforcing, however, and 
appeals are heard in the federal circuit with jurisdiction over the 
dispute.  The Board’s conclusions enjoy great deference in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals:38 from 2010 to 2015, seventy-six percent of Board 
orders were enforced in full on appellate review, with eighty-five 
percent enforced at least in part.39 
C. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. and the Taft-Hartley Amendments 
of 1947 
In order to understand Jefferson Standard, the case at the center of 
this Note, it is important to consider two developments between the 
1935 passage of the Wagner Act and the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
1953. 
In 1937, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp.40 upheld the constitutionality of the NLRA for the first time.41  
It is significant that the Court upheld the Act under Congress’s power 
to regulate interstate commerce, on the grounds that that failure to 
recognize collective bargaining rights was a chief cause of the strikes 
                                                                                                                                         
 34. 29 U.S.C. § 153. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Morris describes the Board as functioning like a “Supreme Court,” intended 
to give shape to those provisions of the Act expressed in broad and flexible language. 
See Morris, supra note 30, at 16. 
 37. Who We Are, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-
are [https://perma.cc/2R9T-WGFW]. 
 38. See Wayneview Care Ctr. v. NLRB, 664 F.3d 341, 348 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(finding that a reviewing court “must uphold the judgment of the Board unless, upon 
reviewing the record as a whole, [it] conclude[s] that the Board’s [factual] findings are 
not supported by substantial evidence, or that the Board acted arbitrarily or 
otherwise erred in applying established law to the facts of the case”) (citation 
omitted). 
 39. Appellate Court Decisions, 1974–2017, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., 
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphs-data/litigations/appellate-court-decisions-
1974-2016 [https://perma.cc/5X8Y-23YL]. 
 40. 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937). 
 41. Id. at 30. 
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that so often disrupted the national economy.42  One commentator 
argues that the decision represents a missed opportunity: the Court’s 
use of economic terminology, rather than the language of industrial 
democracy, reduced Jones & Laughlin to a limited victory at best for 
supporters of “worker human rights.”43  The decision made clear that 
the interests at stake were commercial, not democratic.44 
Ten years later, however, the 80th Congress overrode President 
Truman’s veto to enact the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 194745 
(“Taft-Hartley” or “the Amendments”).  Taft-Hartley, in contrast to 
the Wagner Act, was supported by management and sharply opposed 
by organized labor.46  Labor leaders claimed that the Amendments, 
which, inter alia, gave employees the right to refrain from union 
membership47 and employers a right to freedom of speech,48 were a 
“flagrant violation” of the Thirteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.49  The Act’s defenders, on the other hand, argued that it 
safeguarded the rights of both individual workers and management 
against abuses by excessively powerful unions and protected the 
public from strikes made possible by union employment 
monopolies.50  While both supporters and opponents would agree 
that Taft-Hartley was intended to limit union power as expanded by 
                                                                                                                                         
 42. Id. at 42 (“Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of 
the right of employees to self-organization and to have representatives of their own 
choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining is often an essential condition of 
industrial peace.”).  Several Legislators involved in drafting the Bill, however, had 
believed that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments offered clearer paths to 
constitutionality. See James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the 
Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921–
1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 54–55 (2002). 
 43. James A. Gross, The NLRB: Then and Now, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 213, 
216–17 (2011). 
 44. See Pope, supra note 42, at 83–85. 
 45. Act of June 23, 1947, PUB. L. NO. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136.  The statute’s official 
name is the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947. 
 46. FRED WITNEY & BENJAMIN J. TAYLOR, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 42–43 
(Prentice Hall eds., 7th ed. 1996). 
 47. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 48. Id. § 158(c). 
 49. See Pope, supra note 42, at 109 (“AFL Secretary George Meany delivered the 
administration’s response.  Five months before, Meany had charged that Taft-Hartley 
transgressed the Thirteenth Amendment and warned that American workers would 
inevitably resist ‘such a flagrant’ violation of the Constitution.”). 
 50. WITNEY & TAYLOR, supra note 46, at 43. 
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the Wagner Act,51 they dispute whether the Amendments changed 
the statute’s underpinning policy objectives.52 
Although Taft-Hartley granted new rights to individual workers 
and employers, it did not repeal the Act’s substantive provisions 
supporting collective bargaining.53  The conflicting policy implications 
left the Court in Jefferson Standard with the task of reconciling the 
pro-worker Wagner Act with the pro-management provisions of Taft 
Hartley.54  Compounding the difficulty was apparent inconsistency 
between, on the one hand, the rights-based language of the Wagner 
Act and its legislative history, and on the other, the Court’s holding in 
Jones & Laughlin that the Act merely regulated interstate 
commerce.55  Such were the tensions in American labor law when the 
Supreme Court confronted the problem presented in Jefferson 
Standard: can an employee’s section 7 right to engage in “concerted 
activities for . . . mutual aid or protection”56 be harmonized with an 
employer’s section 10 right to terminate that employee “for cause?”57 
D. Jefferson Standard 
The labor dispute in Jefferson Standard revolved around an 
arbitration provision in the employment contract between a North 
Carolina broadcasting company and its twenty-two technicians.58  The 
technicians, represented in negotiations by Local Union No. 1229, 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (“the union”), 
sought renewal of the existing scheme under which all discharge 
disputes were resolved through arbitration.59  The broadcaster, 
                                                                                                                                         
 51. See Morris, supra note 30, at 15 (acknowledging that Taft-Hartley pursued 
“limitations on the exercise of economic power that unions were either employing or 
were deemed likely to employ”). 
 52. See id. at 8 (blaming the revisionist efforts of organized management for 
“[t]he common assertion that Taft-Hartley changed the policy of the Act”). 
 53. See 29 U.S.C. § 157. See generally Morris, supra note 30. 
 54. See Gross, supra note 43, at 221 (“Taft-Hartley’s protection of the right to 
refrain from joining a union as equal to its protection of the right to join a union to 
engage in collective bargaining has resulted in a U.S. labor policy at cross-purposes 
with itself.”). 
 55. See generally Pope, supra note 42. 
 56. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 57. Id. § 160. 
 58. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. 464, 466–67 (1953). 
 59. See id.  At the time, arbitration was perceived as a more worker-friendly 
forum for dispute than the courts, filled with judges “terrified of class struggle, mob 
rule, the anarchists and their bombs, railroad strikers, and the collapse of the social 
system as they knew it.” LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 
555 (Simon & Schuster eds., 2d ed. 1985). 
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Jefferson Standard, sought to limit arbitration to determining the 
relevant facts, leaving it to the company to decide whether those facts 
supported the disputed discharge.60  The negotiations began in 
December 1948, but talks stalled and the existing agreement expired 
on January 31, 1949.61  The technicians remained with the company 
and negotiations resumed in July, but by July 8 they had broken down 
once more.62 
On July 9, the workers began to picket the broadcaster’s station, 
distributing handbills that accused the employer of unfairness and 
explained the dispute over the arbitration provision.63  The handbills 
named the union as the employees’ representative; the employees did 
not strike, and picketed only while off-duty.64  The company did not 
object to this conduct, and took no action against the employees 
involved.65 
Then, on August 24, the workers issued a new handbill.66  Omitted 
were the earlier bill’s reference to the union and its emphasis on the 
disputed arbitration clause; the new handbill instead contained “a 
vitriolic attack on the quality of the company’s television 
broadcasts.”67  Under the heading “Is Charlotte a Second-Class 
City?” the handbill suggested that Jefferson Standard did not believe 
Charlotte deserved television coverage of local sports and other 
events, and that the company refused to invest in equipment to 
provide it.68  Workers distributed the handbills on the streets around 
the station, placed them in restaurants, buses, and barbershops, and 
mailed copies to local businessmen.69 
The company responded, on September 3, by firing ten of the 
technicians identified as having sponsored or distributed the new 
handbill.70  The union complained to the NLRB, alleging that 
Jefferson Standard had committed an unfair labor practice by firing 
employees engaged in protected concerted activity.71  The Board 
found that one of the terminated employees had played no part in the 
                                                                                                                                         
 60. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 467. 
 61. Id. at 466–67. 
 62. Id. at 467. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 468. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 467. 
 71. Id. at 469. 
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attack and therefore ordered that he be reinstated with back pay.72  
The other nine employees, however, were found to have sponsored or 
distributed the handbills.73  The Board ruled that the company had 
committed no unfair labor practice in firing those employees and 
declined to order reinstatement.74 
Two strands of thought run through the Board’s opinion.  First, the 
Board notes that the protections afforded workers engaged in 
concerted activity do not apply where the workers either pursue an 
“unlawful” objective or resort to “indefensible” means.75  The 
opinion argues that the attack, aimed as it was at harming the 
financial interests of the company, was “hardly less ‘indefensible’ than 
acts of physical sabotage.”76  Second, however, the Board emphasizes 
that “the subject-matter of the employees’ verbal attack upon the 
employer was not related to their interests as employees.”77  The 
Board seems to suggest here that the real problem with the attack was 
not necessarily the product disparagement but rather the tenuous 
connection to the labor dispute and its concededly lawful purpose.78 
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the decision of 
the Board and remanded the case.79  The court’s brief opinion held 
that the Board had applied the wrong criterion when it asked whether 
the means used by the employees were “indefensible.”80  The proper 
inquiry, according to the Court of Appeals, was the same as applied 
to the employees’ ultimate objective—whether the means used were 
“lawful.”81  The court remanded this question to the Board for further 
findings.82 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Burton, reversed.83  
Citing section 10(c) of the NLRA,84 Justice Burton asserted that 
                                                                                                                                         
 72. Jefferson Standard Broad. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1507, 1513–14 (1951). 
 73. Id. at 1518. 
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. at 1509–10. 
 76. Id. at 1511. 
 77. Id. at 1512 (emphasis in original). 
 78. Id. at 1512 n.18.  The opinion notes that although the ultimate purpose of the 
attack, which was intended to extract concessions from the employer in negotiations, 
was lawful, this purpose was undisclosed. Id. at 1511. 
 79. See Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 186, 
189 (D.C. Cir. 1952). 
 80. See id. at 188. 
 81. See Id. at 188–89. 
 82. Id. at 189. 
 83. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. 464, 465 (1953). 
 84. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012) (“No order of the Board shall require the 
reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or 
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“[t]here is no more elemental cause for discharge of an employee 
than disloyalty to his employer,” and that “the Taft-Hartley Act seeks 
to strengthen, rather than to weaken, that cooperation, continuity of 
service and cordial contractual relation between employer and 
employee that is born of loyalty to their common enterprise.”85  
Justice Burton quoted the view of Justice Hughes, expressed in Jones 
& Laughlin, that “the Board is not entitled to make its authority a 
pretext for interference with the right of discharge when that right is 
exercised for reasons other than [employee] intimidation and 
coercion.”86  Applying these reflections to the facts at hand, the Court 
wrote: 
Assuming that there had been no pending labor controversy, the 
conduct of [the employees] from August 24 through September 3 
unquestionably would have provided adequate cause for their 
disciplinary discharge within the meaning of s 10(c).  Their attack 
related itself to no labor practice of the company.  It made no 
reference to wages, hours, or working conditions.  The policies 
attacked were those of finance and public relations for which 
management, not technicians, must be responsible.  The attack 
asked for no public sympathy or support.87 
The Court held that “[t]he fortuity of the coexistence of a labor 
dispute affords these technicians no substantial defense.”88  The only 
connection between the attack and the contract dispute was that the 
employees hoped by the former to gain concessions in the latter.89  
The Board treated the handbill not as part of the labor dispute but as 
a “separable attack” on the employer’s interests, and the Court 
stressed that this finding was the agency’s to make.90  Justice Burton’s 
language indicates that the technicians’ conduct was unprotected 
because it was not sufficiently related to the contemporaneous labor 
dispute. 
But the Court’s disposition of the case has been interpreted as a 
holding that the employees’ criticism was unprotected, regardless of 
                                                                                                                                         
discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended 
or discharged for cause.”). 
 85. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 472. 
 86. Id. at 474 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45–46 
(1937)). 
 87. Id. at 476. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 476–77. 
 90. Id. at 477, 475. 
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the Board’s view of the matter, because the technician resorted to 
disloyal “means.”91  Justice Burton wrote: 
We find no occasion to remand this cause to the Board for further 
specificity of findings.  Even if the attack were to be treated, as the 
Board has not treated it, as a concerted activity partly or wholly 
within the scope of those mentioned in s 7, the means used by the 
employees in conducting the attack have deprived the attackers of 
the protection of that section, when read in the light and context of 
the purpose of the Act.92 
Justice Frankfurter dissented.  He made three main points: first, he 
observed that the Court did not address the holding of the Court of 
Appeals that the Board applied the wrong criterion by asking 
whether the conduct was “indefensible” rather than “unlawful.”93  
Second, the Justice stressed that section 7 protects many activities 
that could be classed as disloyal, and that the criterion apparently 
approved by the majority risked frustrating the whole purpose of 
Act.94  Finally, Justice Frankfurter argued that the disloyalty criterion 
was imprecise and would “open the door wide to individual judgment 
by Board members and judges.”95 
II.  PAST AND PRESENT PROBLEMS WITH THE DISLOYALTY 
EXCEPTION 
Part II presents a recent Circuit split over the proper approach to 
third party appeals under the NLRA, comparing the permissive 
approach of the D.C. Circuit with the Eighth Circuit’s restrictive 
reading of the NLRB’s disloyalty doctrine.  Part II considers the 
Board’s Mountain Shadows test as a response to sustained 
disagreement and confusion over the holding of Jefferson Standard 
and the factors relevant to disloyalty analysis.  Finally, Part II 
explores other difficulties that have troubled courts reviewing Board 
interpretations of Jefferson Standard, including questions over the 
proper scope of deference to the Board, the age of the NLRA, and 
the suggestion of Justice Frankfurter and subsequent commentators 
that every exercise of section 7 rights could be characterized as 
disloyal. 
                                                                                                                                         
 91. Id. at 477–78. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 479 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. at 480. 
 95. Id. at 481. 
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A. Ongoing Confusion Over the Holding of Jefferson Standard 
Justice Frankfurter’s criticisms of the disloyalty standard as 
indeterminate and subjective have grown in force in the sixty-five 
years since the decision.  The NLRB and reviewing courts have 
struggled to clarify the reach and import of Jefferson Standard.  
Critics have noted confusion over the true basis for the majority’s 
decision in that case; the factors relevant to the disloyalty analysis; 
and the respective roles of courts, Congress, and the Board in 
defining the exception.96 
Two recent appellate cases show that Jefferson Standard remains 
inconsistently interpreted and unpredictably applied.  The courts in 
DirecTV v. NLRB97 and MikLin Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB98 applied 
the same test, announced in the Board’s 2000 Mountain Shadows99 
decision, under which employees’ appeals to third parties are 
protected where “the communication is related to an ongoing labor 
dispute[(“prong 1”)] and when the communication is not so disloyal, 
reckless, or maliciously untrue as to lose the Act’s protection [(“prong 
2”)].”100  Prong 1 is supported by language in Jefferson Standard 
explaining that the handbill was so tenuously connected to the labor 
dispute as to constitute an unprotected “separable attack.”  Prong 2 is 
derived from Justice Burton’s reflections on disloyalty and from the 
Court’s ambiguous words of disposition.  Because Jefferson Standard 
could have been decided on either ground, it is not clear whether 
satisfaction of either Mountain Shadows prong is a necessary or 
sufficient condition of protection.  This ambiguity is at the heart of 
the present split, in which the Eighth and D.C. Circuits applied the 
Board’s test very differently. 
B. DirecTV v. NLRB 
In DirecTV v. NLRB, the D.C. Circuit upheld a Board order 
resting on a narrow reading of the disloyalty exception as 
implemented by the Mountain Shadows test.101  The case arose out of 
a dispute between a hardware company and its engineers.102  At issue 
was the company’s compensation policy, which penalized salesmen 
                                                                                                                                         
 96. See infra Sections II.D–F. 
 97. 837 F.3d 25 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 98. 861 F.3d 812, 821 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 99. Am. Golf Corp. (Mountain Shadows), 330 N.L.R.B. 1238 (2000). 
 100. Id. at 1240 (emphasis in original). 
 101. DirecTV v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 25, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2016), enforcing MasTec 
Advanced Techs., 357 N.L.R.B. 103 (2011). 
 102. Id. at 28–30. 
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who failed to convince customers to install a phone line with their 
television.103  The employees appeared on local television to air their 
grievances.104  During their segment, however, the employees not 
only complained of the unfairness of the policy itself but further 
alleged that the company had responded to their internal complaints 
by encouraging them to lie to customers by telling them their 
receivers would blow up if they failed to install the extra line.105  After 
the company terminated the technicians, the Board ordered 
reinstatement.106 
Although the opinion of the D.C. Circuit is complicated by the 
inaccuracy of the employees’ allegations,107 two key points are clear.  
First, the court upheld the Board’s view that, because the employees 
had referred in the segment to the ongoing pay dispute, they could be 
terminated only if their conduct was “flagrantly disloyal, wholly 
incommensurate with any grievances which [the employees] might 
have.”108  The court did not examine the Board’s finding that “the 
employee communications here were clearly related to the labor 
dispute,”109 but ruled that to manifest such a connection entitles 
employees to a certain degree of immunity from discharge. 
The second question presented in DirecTV was whether the Board 
was permitted to consider subjective intent in determining which 
conduct merits elevation to the status of ‘flagrant disloyalty.’110  
Acknowledging its 1992 holding in George A. Hormel & Co. v. 
NLRB111 that a subjective test for disloyalty risked frustrating the 
NLRA’s purpose of retaining the employer’s right to discharge 
disloyal employees,112 the court nevertheless upheld the Board’s 
                                                                                                                                         
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 28–31. 
 106. Id. at 28. 
 107. Id. at 29 (“Some of the advice plainly was not meant to be taken literally, such 
as when a MasTec manager jokingly told technicians they should tell customers the 
DirecTV system would ‘blow up’ without a phone connection.”). 
 108. Id. at 36 (quoting MasTec Advanced Techs., 357 N.L.R.B. 103, 108 (2011)). 
 109. Id. at 35. 
 110. Id. at 32. 
 111. 962 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also discussion infra Section II.D.3. 
 112. Id. at 1065 (“Yet under the Board’s subjective test, the employer could not 
lawfully discharge him without showing also [ . . . ] that the employee’s 
conduct . . . was . . . motivated . . . to actually encourage or support a boycott.’  
Because extending protection to such conduct would so circumscribe as to defeat the 
employer’s right to discharge an employee who is working against the employer’s 
business interest, we conclude that a subjective test is inconsistent with the Act.  
Rather, the Act requires an objective test of disloyalty.”). 
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approach.113  The court reasoned that Hormel barred a subjective test 
for the presence of disloyalty, not for the degree of any disloyalty 
chargeable to the employee, and held that in analyzing the latter the 
Board was entitled to consider subjective intent.114 
Judge Brown dissented—vigorously.115  She disagreed with the 
majority on both points, asserting that the case “demonstrates the 
lengths to which the Board will go to contort an even-handed Act into 
an anti-employer manifesto.  Instead of attempting to balance 
conflicting interests, the NLRB reacts like a pinball machine stuck on 
tilt, reflexively ensuring employers always lose a turn.”116  Judge 
Brown maintained that Jefferson Standard did not require employers 
to show employees’ flagrant disloyalty.117  Rather, employees’ appeals 
to third parties lose the Act’s protection when they either fail to refer 
to a labor dispute or are “disloyal,” as defined by Jefferson Standard 
and its progeny.118  The majority was wrong, therefore, to immunize 
all conduct falling below its heightened standard.119 
Judge Brown also differed from the majority on the relevance of 
employee motive or intent to the disloyalty analysis.  The judge 
argued that circuit precedent demanded an objective test: to show 
disloyalty or the heightened flagrant disloyalty, an employer would be 
required to prove his employee’s state of mind to fire him, which was 
a burden the court had previously held to be an unreasonable 
interpretation of the Act.120 
C. MikLin v. NLRB 
According to the majority in DirecTV, the Board had not required 
the employer to show the presence of malicious intent in third party 
appeals.  Instead, the D.C. Circuit merely weighed the absence of 
such motivation as one factor.121  In MikLin Enterprises, Inc. v. 
                                                                                                                                         
 113. DirecTV, 873 F.3d at 28. 
 114. Id. at 39–40. 
 115. Id. at 46 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
 116. Id. at 47. 
 117. Id. at 52–53. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 53–54. 
 120. Id. at 48–49. 
 121. See id. at 37–38 (majority opinion) (rebutting charges of “an inconsistency 
with Hormel in the Board’s noting (as one consideration) the lack of evidence that 
the employees participated in the newscast with the intention to cause subscribers to 
cancel their service rather than the intention to gain public support in the pay 
dispute”).  MasTec, who provided installation services to DirecTV, petitioned for 
certiorari to the Supreme Court on the subjective intent issue. MasTec Advanced 
2018] BITING THE HAND THAT FEEDS 777 
NLRB, however, the Eighth Circuit confronted a Board decision that 
did treat intent as dispositive: ordering reinstatement of sandwich 
shop employees because the employer was unable to prove that their 
public criticisms were maliciously motivated.122  The Eighth Circuit, 
sitting en banc, declined to enforce the order, holding that by 
requiring proof of malicious intent the Board “has not interpreted 
Jefferson Standard—it has overruled it.”123 
In MikLin, the employees of a Jimmy John’s sandwich shop were 
engaged in a dispute over the employer’s sick leave policy, which 
barred workers from calling in sick without finding their own 
replacement.124  During flu season, the employees put posters up 
around the shop suggesting to customers that the workers who made 
their sandwiches could be sick and infectious.125  Small print at the 
bottom of the poster made reference to the labor dispute and directed 
readers to the union website.126 
When the store manager took down the posters, the employees 
sent copies to more than one hundred media outlets, along with a 
letter and a press release to similar effect.127  The dispute was not 
resolved, and the employees persevered, issuing a new poster that 
substituted the company vice-president’s name and personal contact 
information for the previous language that referred to the dispute.128  
The vice-president was “bombarded” with phone calls from 
customers concerned about the safety of eating at Jimmy Johns.129  
                                                                                                                                         
Techs. v. NLRB, 138 S. Ct. 138 (Oct. 2, 2017) (denying certiorari).  The petition was 
denied, id., perhaps because (1) the D.C. Circuit did not interpret the Board’s 
opinion as giving dispositive weight to subjective intent, and (2) several courts have 
acknowledged the relevance of subjective intent as one factor of the analysis. See, 
e.g., MikLin Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 861 F.3d 812, 821 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 122. MikLin Enters., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 27 (Aug. 21, 2014)). 
 123. MikLin, 861 F.3d at 815. 
 124. Id. at 817. 
 125. Id. at 815–16 (“[The posters] prominently featured two identical images of a 
Jimmy John’s sandwich.  Above the first image were the words, ‘YOUR 
SANDWICH MADE BY A HEALTHY JIMMY JOHN’S WORKER.’  The text 
above the second image said, ‘YOUR SANDWICH MADE BY A SICK JIMMY 
JOHN’S WORKER.’  ‘HEALTHY’ and ‘SICK’ were in red letters, larger than the 
surrounding text in white.  Below the pictures, white text asked: ‘CAN’T TELL THE 
DIFFERENCE?’  The response, in red and slightly smaller: ‘THAT’S TOO BAD 
BECAUSE JIMMY JOHN’S WORKERS DON’T GET PAID SICK DAYS.  
SHOOT, WE CAN’T EVEN CALL IN SICK.’  Below, in slightly smaller text, was 
the warning, ‘WE HOPE YOUR IMMUNE SYSTEM IS READY BECAUSE 
YOU’RE ABOUT TO TAKE THE SANDWICH TEST.’”). 
 126. Id. at 816. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 817. 
 129. Id. 
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When the employer ultimately fired six of the organizing employees, 
the Board ordered reinstatement.130 
Vacating the Board’s order, the Eighth Circuit expressly rejected 
the approach of the DirectTV majority.131  The Eighth Circuit’s 
reading of Jefferson Standard mirrors that of Judge Brown: reference 
to a labor dispute is no more than a threshold condition of section 7 
protection.  Conduct must independently satisfy the disloyalty prong, 
meaning, at a minimum, that conduct as disloyal as that of the 
Jefferson Standard technicians is unprotected.132  The court also held 
that the Board’s test, by requiring malicious intent, would 
impermissibly restrict the employer’s right to terminate.133 
The dissent argued that Jefferson Standard was decided on the 
grounds that the handbill was insufficiently related to the dispute, and 
that the language read as requiring a disloyalty exception “cannot be 
binding here.”134  Moreover, the dissent maintained, the malicious 
motive requirement was the Board’s own creation, and not an 
interpretation of Jefferson Standard.135  As such, it was entitled to 
deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.136 
It is clear that two courts applying the Board’s Mountain Shadows 
test can take very different approaches while both claiming to view 
the test through the lens of Jefferson Standard.  History has borne out 
Justice Frankfurter’s warning that the majority’s opinion would offer 
little guidance to future courts and Board panels.  No party in either 
case objected to the test itself, which appears designed to 
accommodate the doctrinal diversity of its predecessors.137 
D.  Confusion over the Factors Relevant to Disloyalty Analysis 
The problems with the disloyalty doctrine go beyond the structural 
ambiguities of the Mountain Shadows test.  As Justice Frankfurter 
                                                                                                                                         
 130. Id. at 818 (referencing the NLRB’s previous order of restatement in MikLin 
Enters., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 27 (Aug. 21, 2014)). 
 131. Id. at 820 n.1 (stating that “we disagree with the contrary conclusion of the 
panel majority in [DirecTV]”). 
 132. Id. at 820. 
 133. Id. at 822. 
 134. Id. at 832 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) 
(holding that “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, 
the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute”). 
 137. See infra Sections II.D.1–3. 
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noted in Jefferson Standard, ‘loyalty’ is an imprecise term and is hard 
to define objectively.  The dispute over the role of intent is just the 
latest confusion over the factors relevant to the presence, or severity, 
of ‘disloyalty.’  Professor Melinda Branscomb writes that the 
Jefferson Standard Court “created this imprecision” when it “used 
product disparagement and disloyalty almost interchangeably, giving 
no guidance on the factors relevant to each.”138  One commentator 
suggests the term “disloyalty” is no more than a “catchphrase,” 
without definite content, used in place of rigorous analysis.139 
1. Early Interpretations of Jefferson Standard 
Jefferson Standard was at first interpreted as equating disloyalty 
with public disparagement of an employer’s product.140  Later cases, 
however, made clear that not all disparagement was unprotected.141  
Courts began to focus on the relationship between any disparagement 
and an ongoing labor dispute, with one prominent approach asking 
whether the criticism “appeared necessary to effectuate the 
employees’ lawful aims.”142  Other factors deemed relevant to the 
analysis in some courts included the tone of the criticism,143 the 
tendency of the criticism to harm the employer,144 and the apparent 
motive of the workers.145  The variety of factors eligible for 
consideration and the lack of any guiding principle in weighing them 
                                                                                                                                         
 138. Melinda J. Branscomb, Labor, Loyalty, and the Corporate Campaign, 73 B.U. 
L. REV. 291, 322 (1993). 
 139. See Finkin, supra note 2, at 563. 
 140. Patterson-Sargent Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1627, 1627–28 (1956) (discharging 
striking employees, who distributed handbills claiming that paint made by 
replacement workers was unsafe, was justified by disloyal product disparagement). 
 141. See Cmty. Hosp. of Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 
1976) (protecting nurse’s televised claims that salary dispute compromised patient 
care because they were “directly related to protected concerted activities”); Allied 
Aviation Serv. Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 229 (1980) (holding that airline mechanic’s letter to 
airport manager linking lack of established operating procedures or training 
programs with risk of “tragedy” at Auto/Gas site was protected despite inflammatory 
language because directly connected to labor dispute). 
 142. NLRB v. Mount Desert Island Hosp., 695 F.2d 634, 640–41 (1st Cir. 1982) 
(determining that nurse’s public criticism of hospital staffing procedures, expressed in 
letter to newspaper editor, was protected because he had first tried to raise the 
concern directly with management and because “criticism of the Hospital’s 
administration was intertwined inextricably with working conditions”). 
 143. See generally Misericordia Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 
1980). 
 144. See generally NLRB v. Red Top, Inc., 455 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1972). 
 145. See Richboro Cmty. Mental Health Council, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 1267, 1268 
(1979). 
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against each other produced confusing, apparently conflicting 
outcomes146 that did not, Professor Branscomb notes, “turn 
consistently on loyalty or its absence.”147 
2. The Ninth Circuit Shifts Focus to the “Connection” Inquiry that 
Would Become Prong 1 of the Mountain Shadows Test 
In Sierra Publishing Co. v. NLRB148 the Ninth Circuit tried to 
gather in the many loose strands of the disloyalty analysis, declaring 
that each may do some work in distinguishing protected from 
unprotected criticism.149  The case involved a dispute between a 
newspaper and its employees, whose union wrote to the paper’s 
advertisers noting the disruptive effect of the disagreement on 
circulation and profits and urging them to encourage the paper to 
reach a settlement.150  The court noted, first, that the appeal’s 
connection to an ongoing labor dispute was the most important factor 
to consider in determining whether it was unprotected disloyalty or 
protected concerted activity.151  Second, the court stated that all third-
party appeals were to be evaluated in their whole context, and that 
although factors such as tone, motive, and harm were all relevant, 
none was dispositive: “[i]n summary, the disloyalty standard is at base 
a question of whether the employees’ efforts to improve their wages 
or working conditions through influencing strangers to the labor 
dispute were pursued in a reasonable manner under the 
circumstances.”152  The court held that the letter to the advertisers 
was protected despite disparaging the paper’s product—which, from 
                                                                                                                                         
 146. Compare Golden Day Sch., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1292, 1292 (1978) (deciding 
that day care center engaged in unfair labor practice by firing employees who 
distributed, to parents of children in the center’s care, a leaflet alleging the center was 
unsafe and unsanitary, discriminated against disabled children and those funded by 
the county, falsified evaluations, and lied to parents), with Red Top, 455 F.2d at 721 
(declining to protect employee’s threat to complain directly to customers about 
working conditions because it was calculated to harm employer’s business interests). 
 147. Branscomb, supra note 138, at 328. 
 148. See generally Sierra Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 149. See id. at 217. 
 150. Id. at 214. 
 151. Id. at 217.  The court explained that:  
Such a focus is appropriate.  If unions are not permitted to address matters 
that are of direct interest to third parties in addition to complaining about 
their own working conditions, it is unlikely that workers’ undisputed right to 
make third party appeals in pursuit of better working conditions would be 
anything but an empty provision.  
Id. 
 152. Id. at 220. 
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the advertiser’s point of view, was circulation—because it was related 
to the dispute, its tone was “constructive and hopeful,” and because, 
in the absence of malicious intent, any harm to the employer’s 
business interests was reasonable under the circumstances.153 
3. The D.C. Circuit Breathes New Life into the “Disloyalty” 
Inquiry that Would Become Prong 2 of the Mountain Shadows Test 
Three years after Sierra Publishing, however, in George A. Hormel 
& Co. v. NLRB,154 the D.C. Circuit appeared to hold that “working 
against the employer’s business interest” was in fact sufficient to 
constitute disloyalty forfeiting protection of the Act—however close 
the connection between the criticism and the labor dispute.155  In 
Hormel, the court applied the rule that a third party appeal—here, 
public support for a boycott of the employer’s products—is protected 
only where it: “(1) is related to an ongoing labor dispute and (2) does 
not disparage the employer’s product.”156  The Board’s requirement 
that the employer prove malicious intent, the court held, “would so 
circumscribe as to defeat the employer’s right to discharge an 
employee who is working against the employer’s business 
interests.”157  The test was therefore inconsistent with the D.C. 
Circuit’s interpretation of the NLRA in light of the Taft-Hartley 
Amendments.  The court not only assumed that Jefferson Standard 
precluded product disparagement, but held further that the decision 
requires the Board to consider the objective tendency of employee 
conduct to work against the employer’s business interest in 
determining disloyalty.158 
                                                                                                                                         
 153. Id. 
 154. See generally George A. Hormel & Co. v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir. 
1992) (declining to enforce Board reinstatement order that impermissibly required 
employer to prove malicious intent and finding company justly discharged worker for 
rally appearance supporting a boycott of the employer’s product, whether the worker 
intended harm or not). 
 155. Id. at 1065. 
 156. Id. at 1064 (citing Sierra Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 216 (9th Cir. 
1989)). 
 157. Id. at 1065. 
 158. Id. 
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E. The Disloyalty Exception Is Inconsistent with NLRA Provisions 
that Expressly Protect Strikes, Boycotts, and Other  
Concerted Activity 
The Mountain Shadows test applied in MikLin and DirecTV 
appears designed to accommodate the conflicting approaches of the 
Sierra Publishing and Hormel courts.  Both the connection to the 
labor dispute and the detriment to the employer play a part.  But the 
present split shows the flaw in this approach: as Justice Frankfurter 
warned in 1953, disloyalty and concerted action are “like two halves 
of a pair of shears.”159 
Third-party appeals divide panels so deeply because they 
“effectuate the employees’ lawful aims”160 only insofar as the 
employees “bite the hand that feeds [them].”161  Any test for 
protection that seeks to balance the appeal’s value to employees 
against its threatened harm to employers risks excluding the most 
effective criticisms, protecting the employer from all but the most 
toothless charges.  The ‘disloyalty exception’ reading of Jefferson 
Standard is fundamentally inconsistent with the NLRA’s express 
protections because every exercise of section 7 rights can be viewed as 
disloyal—and the greater the prejudice to the employer, the more 
effectively the activity works towards the employees’ “mutual aid or 
protection.”162 
F. Courts Disagree over the Source and Status of the Disloyalty 
Exception and the Proper Scope of Deference to the Board 
A further problem with disloyalty analysis is disagreement over the 
proper scope of judicial deference to Board decisions.  Professor 
Branscomb argues that “principles of administrative law ought to lend 
some measure of stability” to the doctrine, but that the emotional and 
political implications of the concept tempt judges improperly to revise 
Board determinations.163  In fact, the back-and-forth between the 
                                                                                                                                         
 159. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. 464, 480 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 160. NLRB v. Mount Desert Island Hosp., 695 F.2d 634, 640 (1st Cir. 1981). 
 161. NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, THE COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE 183 
(Theodore St. Antoine ed., 2d ed. 2005) (citing Forest City Publ’g Co., 58 LA 773, 
783 (1972) (McCoy, Arb.)). 
 162. See Branscomb, supra note 138, at 336 (noting that the Act expressly permits 
two forms of activity—strikes and lockouts—”that are only successful when they 
cause or threaten economic harm”; that the Act “requires employees to act out of 
self-interest”; and that “section 7 rights are especially important in situations when 
the interests of management and labor are most antagonistic” (emphasis in original)). 
 163. Id. at 340. 
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MikLin majority and dissent paints a deference picture clouded by 
more than judicial inconsistency: confusion over the basis for the 
holding leaves it unclear when the Board can be seen as applying its 
own test and when it is interpreting Jefferson Standard.164  And if the 
Board is interpreting Supreme Court precedent that purportedly 
construed the unambiguous provisions of a statute, the Supreme 
Court’s BrandX165 decision may require greater Board autonomy.166  
A further complication arises with the suggestion that section 10(c), 
under Jefferson Standard, receives its content from the common law 
of ‘master’ and ‘servant.’167  This view implies a greater role for the 
judiciary in defining disloyalty, with the paradoxical result of a Board-
defined rule and a court-defined exception. 
G. The Disloyalty Exception Is Out of Date 
Finally, several commentators have maintained that the disloyalty 
exception, and the NLRA itself, are outdated.  The character of this 
charge depends on the critic’s understanding of the Act and its 
provisions: Professor Matthew Finkin argues from changed values, 
contending that we should re-examine the ‘disloyalty’ exception in 
light of modern recognition that much employee criticism serves the 
public interest.168  Several writers argue the NLRA and the disloyalty 
exception are ill-equipped to handle modern ‘corporate campaigns,’ 
which “seek to equalize the bargaining power between labor and 
management through viral action directed at altering consumer 
perception of a company’s image.”169  And Professor Cynthia Estlund 
argues that labor law’s fundamental principles and implementing 
strategies “have been nearly frozen, or ossified, for over fifty 
years.”170 
                                                                                                                                         
 164. MikLin Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 816 F.3d 1, 7 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 165. Nat’l Cable & Tel. Ass’n v. BrandX Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) 
(“[Prior appellate court] construction of a statute trumps an agency construction 
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its 
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no 
room for agency discretion.”). 
 166. MikLin, 816 F.3d at 7. 
 167. See Finkin, supra note 2, at 548. 
 168. See generally id. 
 169. Geordan G. Logan, Social Media Policy Confusion: The NLRB’s Dated 
Embrace of Concerted Activity Misconstrues the Realities of Twenty-First Century 
Collective Action, 15 NEV. L.J. 354, 356 (2015). See generally Branscomb, supra note 
138. 
 170. Cynthia Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1527, 1530 (2002). 
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III.  AN ALTERNATIVE READING OF JEFFERSON STANDARD 
This part argues that the true flaw in the Board’s disloyalty 
doctrine, as implemented through the Mountain Shadows test, is that 
decision-makers remain free to apply their own conceptions of the 
NLRA’s fundamental purpose.  The result is an unstable, 
unpredictable, and politicized approach to third party appeals.  Part 
III aims to show that, because Jefferson Standard need not be 
interpreted as creating a disloyalty exception to NLRA section 7, the 
Board is free to craft its own approach to employees’ public criticisms 
of employers.  A new test must, however, respond to the Jefferson 
Standard Court’s concern that an overprotective rule could proscribe 
termination even for conduct separable from legitimate concerted 
activity arising out of an ongoing labor dispute.  This part suggests 
that the Board should focus on the connection between the content of 
the criticism and the employees’ goals in the labor dispute in 
distinguishing protected from unprotected third party appeals. 
A. The Mountain Shadows Test Fails to Choose Between 
Competing Visions of NLRA Policy 
Although the charges of indeterminacy, subjectivity, and judicial 
overreach have some force, these problems are far from unique to the 
disloyalty exception and the Mountain Shadows test.  Any test will to 
some extent call on judges to engage in difficult line-drawing and 
definitional exercises, and even the most flexible statutes age from the 
moment the Presidential ink is dry.  In some matters, “it is more 
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be 
settled right.”171 
But not in all matters.  The problems surrounding disloyalty 
doctrine are symptomatic of deeper issues with the NLRA, and these 
suffice to justify reexamination of at least the constraint that “imposes 
the most crippling limitations”172 on workplace collective action. 
The fundamental problem with the disloyalty exception, as applied 
by courts today, is its failure to choose between competing 
understandings of the Act’s purpose.  Instead of crafting a rule that 
reliably separates constructive from destructive criticism, the 
Mountain Shadows test asks panels to balance two opposing but 
equal, indeed positively correlated, interests while supplying no 
                                                                                                                                         
 171. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 172. Marion Crane & John Inazu, Re-Assembling Labor, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1791, 1839 (2015). 
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connection to a broader policy or ultimate objective.  Judges who 
believe Congress intended the Board to further the Act’s purposes in 
the role of “neutral guarantor”173 of each party’s rights will view 
third-party appeals that aim only to injure the employer financially as 
a tactic so one-sided as to be incompatible with that policy.  These 
judges stress prong 2 of the Mountain Shadows test and focus on 
‘disloyalty.’  If, as other judges believe, Congress intended the Board 
to promote collective bargaining in the face of the inevitable efforts of 
organized management to defeat it, then there is no reason the 
employer’s interests should prevail where the employees’ conduct is 
lawful and has “some relation to group action in the interest of the 
employees.”174  These judges emphasize prong 1 of Mountain 
Shadows and will protect any conduct sufficiently related to the labor 
dispute to be viewed as part of its anticipated “rough-and-tumble.”175 
The Board’s aim is to separate third party appeals that are 
desirable, in light of the Act’s underlying goals, from those that are 
not.  Under the prevailing understanding of Jefferson Standard, 
section 10(c) protects a “right” of the employer—to terminate 
employees for cause—that must be balanced against the right of the 
employee to engage in concerted activity.  But because the same 
activity will implicate both rights, the test really asks each decision-
maker to apply his own view of the NLRA’s purpose.  In practice, the 
disloyalty exception functions like a “minefield”176—both employer 
and employee are punished for the slightest misstep; such care is 
required that some dare not tread the collective action path at all. 
B. The Differing Views on the Role of Disloyalty Doctrine Reflect 
Wider Disagreement over the Act’s Purpose in Light of the  
Taft-Hartley Amendments 
The disloyalty difficulty mirrors a broader problem with the 
National Labor Relations Act.  Taft-Hartley gave rise to “a 
controversy never before known to follow the passage of a single 
labor law,”177 as politicians, legal scholars, journalists, and 
representatives of labor and employer interests debated the 
Amendments’ meaning and effect.178  Even seventy years ago, 
                                                                                                                                         
 173. Gross, supra note 43, at 222. 
 174. Meyers Indus., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986). 
 175. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. 464, 480 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 176. Branscomb, supra note 138, at 295. 
 177. WHITNEY & TAYLOR, supra note 46, at 42. 
 178. Id. (“Literally hundreds of articles and tracts have been written on the law.  
By December 1, 1949, the National Labor Relations Board reported a bibliography 
786 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
commentators understood that the effect of the Act turned largely on 
this question: did the pro-employer provisions signal a fundamental 
shift in the Act’s purpose, or did Congress’ decision to retain the core 
employee rights indicate that the changes were merely marginal 
policy adjustments?179  As one commentator reminds us, “the 
legitimacy of Board determinations is dependent on their conformity 
to statutory policy.”180 
Professor James Gross argues that Taft-Hartley provisions 
protecting individual rights have been “read as statutory justification 
for” a policy of employer resistance to collective bargaining and for a 
concept of the government’s role as “neutral guarantor” of both 
parties’ rights in a labor dispute.181  Gross argues that this is 
inconsistent with the Act’s initial policy of promoting collective 
bargaining to correct the power imbalance inherent in the essentially 
unregulated at-will regime, and that spurious ambiguity allows 
decision-makers to “choose between these contradictory statutory 
policies and still claim that they are conforming to congressional 
intent.”182  Just as some forms of interference with union organization 
were recast as a defense of the individual employee’s right to bargain 
for himself, so interference with employee’s section 7 rights can be 
justified as protection of the employer’s rights under section 10(c). 
The aim in designing rules to implement a statutory purpose183 is to 
set a standard that limits decision-maker discretion and generates 
predictable results.184  But because the Mountain Shadows test 
accomplishes neither goal, its results are most reliably predicted by 
the political majority of the tribunal applying it.185  Political 
inclinations play a legitimate role in agency interpretation, 
rulemaking, and adjudication, and this is particularly true of the 
                                                                                                                                         
on the legislation that included about 300 items.  By no means did the list include all 
the material written or presented in speeches on the legislation.”). 
 179. See generally Morris, supra note 30. 
 180. Lee Modjeska, In Defense of the NLRB, 33 MERCER L. REV. 851, 855 (1982). 
 181. Gross, supra note 43, at 222. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (“[An agency’s] function 
of filling in the interstices of the Act should be performed, as much as possible, 
through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future.”). 
 184. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Property Rights Systems and the Rule of Law, in 
THE ELGAR COMPANION TO PROPERTY RIGHT ECONOMICS 125, 131 (Enrico 
Colombatto ed., 2003) (“[T]he degree to which the society is bound by law, is 
committed to processes that allow property rights to be secure under legal rules that 
will be applied predictably and not subject to the whims of particular individuals, 
matters.  The commitment to such processes is the essence of the rule of law.”). 
 185. See supra Section II.D. 
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NLRB.  The NLRA is a broadly-written statute, and can 
accommodate diversity and evolution of political opinion on certain 
issues.  But the failure to develop a purpose-built test works 
particular mischief here, where: (1) the standard devised relies on so 
subjective and value-laden a concept as ‘disloyalty’; (2) there is no 
helpful statutory or judicial definition on which to draw;186 (3) it is not 
clear how ‘disloyalty’ implicates the Board’s expertise in labor 
relations;187 and (4) judges, unclear about whether they are 
interpreting Supreme Court precedent, an agency interpretation of 
that precedent, an agency interpretation of the Act, or the NLRA 
itself, are tempted to substitute their judgment for the Board’s.188 
Politics drives inconsistent outcomes, both across and within U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, as illustrated by the vacillations of the D.C. 
Circuit: Republican-appointed majorities handed down pro-employer 
decisions in Hormel (1992)189 and Endicott (2006),190 before the 
Democrat-appointed panel majority changed course in DirecTV 
(2016),191 limiting the reach of the earlier holdings.  In MikLin, 
meanwhile, the court’s two Democrat-appointed judges were alone in 
their pro-employee dissent, while the vast Republican-appointed 
majority signed the court’s en banc ruling for the employer. 
A significant revision in Board policy can be anticipated.  President 
Trump’s latest appointees192 create the Board’s first Republican 
                                                                                                                                         
 186. See Finkin, supra note 2. 
 187. See generally Benjamin L. Ristau, Dysfunctional Disloyalty Standards in 
Employee Criticism Cases, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 913 (2013). 
 188. See, e.g., supra notes 154–58 and accompanying text. 
 189. See generally George A. Hormel v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 1061 (1992) (before D.H. 
Ginsburg, Sentelle, & Henderson, Circuit JJ.); United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit, BALLOTPEDIA, [hereinafter D.C. Circuit Judges], 
https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_District_of_Colum
bia_Circuit [https://perma.cc/5CSB-Z22X] (noting the appointing President of each of 
the Article III and senior judges on the D.C. Circuit). 
 190. See generally Endicott Int’l Techs., Inc. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 532 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (reversing a Board’s reinstatement order on the grounds that it failed to 
consider whether the employees’ conduct was disloyal) (before Henderson, Rogers, 
& Griffith, Circuit JJ.); D.C. Circuit Judges, supra note 189. 
 191. See generally DirecTV, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 25, (D.C. Cir. 2016) (before 
Rogers, Brown, & Srinivasan, Circuit JJ.); D.C. Circuit Judges, supra note 189; Janice 
Rogers Brown, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Janice_Rogers_Brown 
[https://perma.cc/84UT-3D82]. 
 192. These include William Emanuel, formerly a partner at Littler Mendelson, a 
leading management-side labor and employment firm, and Marvin Kaplan, formerly 
Chief Counsel of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, where he 
was an outspoken critic of the Board’s perceived pro-union stance. See Sean Higgins, 
Senate Confirms Marvin Kaplan for NLRB, WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 2, 2017), 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/senate-confirms-marvin-kaplan-for-nlrb/
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majority in almost ten years.193  Moreover, these appointees are the 
same sort of “management attorneys” who would, Senator 
Humphreys predicted in 1953, “interpret[ ] out of existence” the 
rights protected by the Act.194  Although the NLRB implements 
policy by adjudication rather than rulemaking, it should still aim to 
resolve disputes in a manner that provides “guidance for future 
cases.”195  This requires “explicitly identifying the objectives and 
models”196 of the Act’s regulation of labor relations. 
C. The Debate over Whether Taft-Hartley Changed NLRA Policy 
Is Misguided 
Whatever the vision of Senator Wagner or the aspirations of 
commentators then and now, the NLRA is not a human rights 
statute197 and is not designed to guarantee any specific working 
conditions beyond the collective bargaining process.198  But nor is the 
Act indifferent to the balance of power between the parties or the 
means used in negotiations.  As even Gross concedes, the Wagner 
Act was upheld as a strike-prevention measure199 intended to avert 
“the paralyzing consequences of industrial war”200: interference with 
the flow of interstate commerce.  The debate over whether Congress 
                                                                                                                                         
article/2630466 [https://perma.cc/M2EQ-UGZZ]; Lydia Wheeler, Senate Confirms 
Second Trump Nominee to Labor Board, THE HILL (Sept. 25, 2017), 
http://thehill.com/regulation/administration/352345-senate-confirms-second-trump-
nominee-to-labor-board [https://perma.cc/EM44-4Q39]. 
 193. Todd Lebowitz, NLRB Shifts to Republican Majority; Change in Joint 
Employment Doctrine is Likely, WHO IS MY EMP.? (Oct. 9, 2017), 
https://whoismyemployee.com/2017/10/09/nlrb-shifts-to-republican-majority-change-
in-joint-employment-doctrine-is-likely/ [https://perma.cc/DU2E-P6V2]. 
 194. Humphrey Charges ‘Packing’ of N.L.R.B., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1953, at L25, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1953/10/06/archives/humphrey-charges-packing-of-
nlrb.html [https://nyti.ms/2DgwvBx]. 
 195. See generally Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. 464, 481 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Frankfurter criticized the majority opinion in part because “[t]he 
Board and the courts of appeals will hardly find guidance for future cases from this 
Court’s reversal of the Court of Appeals, beyond that which the specific facts of this 
case may afford.” Id. 
 196. BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 14, at 22. 
 197. Even James Gross, who argues that the Act should have been interpreted as a 
human rights statute, acknowledges that his view represents the road not taken. See 
generally Gross, supra note 43. 
 198. These goals are pursued by other labor laws, for example the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2012). 
 199. See Gross, supra note 43, at 217 (noting that the Board’s arguments in Jones 
& Laughlin defended an Act that “could have been titled the ‘Wagner Anti-Strike 
Law’”). 
 200. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937). 
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intended the Board to promote collective bargaining or to serve only 
as impartial referee is misguided because it loses sight of this ultimate 
purpose.  The extent to which the Board supports collective 
bargaining in any given area must be determined by the Act’s 
fundamental objectivenot the reverse. 
Although the Act pursues its purpose through several intermediate 
policies, its provisions are better seen as tools than goals, as means to 
its ultimate end of industrial peace.201  Taft-Hartley consists of 
provisions designed to prevent abuses of Wagner Act policies that fail 
to promote, and may undermine, the Act’s ultimate purposes of 
industrial peace, free-flowing interstate commerce, and economic 
prosperity.202  In formulating rules that best effectuate the purposes 
of the Act, the Board should aim to protect criticism that furthers the 
sustainable, peaceful resolution of a labor dispute, and to discourage 
criticism that does not.  Several considerations might be relevant: is 
the criticism confined to attacks on the actual labor policies of the 
company, or does it attack the employer in general?  Is the criticism 
one the employee could bring to the employer itself?  Would the 
harm caused by the attack survive resolution of the labor dispute? 
But ‘disloyalty’ is an unsuitable criterion.  It may exclude desirable 
criticisms, which can further a discussion, release deep-running 
tensions, prevent strikes, and raise productivity by providing useful 
input from employees.  Conversely, the Board’s present test may 
protect attacks which, because they attack the employer on an 
independent ground, can only broaden disagreement and disrupt 
productive activity.  Such criticism will often have no compensatory 
beneficial effect, addressing things beyond the employer’s control, 
things the employer has plans to address in time, or criticism 
addressing no specific practice of the employer but aiming only to 
work reputational and commercial harm.  Although section 7 does 
not protect all workers who threaten economic harm to their 
employer, limitations on that section’s scope should be tailored to fit 
within a larger, purpose-built plan.  The disloyalty exception is 
instead one of “numerous gaps built on conflicting premises with no 
clear objectives.”203 
                                                                                                                                         
 201. See NLRB v. Fin. Inst. Emps. of Am. Local 1182, 475 U.S. 192, 208 (1986) 
(“The basic purpose of the . . . Act is to preserve industrial peace.”). 
 202. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (providing that the assurance of the rights guaranteed by 
the Act requires elimination of certain “concerted activities which impair the interest 
of the public in the free flow of [interstate] commerce”). 
 203. BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 14, at 195. 
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D. The Board Is Free to Abandon the Disloyalty Exception 
As Judge Brown pointed out in her dissent in DirecTV, the Board 
has progressively narrowed the scope of the disloyalty exception.204  
First, it required “flagrant” disloyalty; next, it considered lack of 
intent as counting against disloyalty; finally, the Board refused to find 
unprotected disloyalty without proof of malicious intent.  But so long 
as the Board views Jefferson Standard as enshrining an employer’s 
right in some cases to terminate disloyal employees, including those 
engaged in otherwise protected concerted activity, it will struggle to 
contain the reach of the exception.205 
Jefferson Standard need not be read as creating a disloyalty 
exception, or an exception of any kind,206 to the NLRA’s protections.  
Although the question before the court was whether the Board erred 
in excluding “indefensible” conduct from the Act’s protections, as 
opposed to the narrower “unlawful” formulation, the Supreme 
Court—as stressed by Justice Frankfurter in dissent207—never 
reached that issue.  The Court emphasized throughout its opinion the 
Board’s finding that the handbill was “a concerted separable attack,” 
which “was not part of an appeal for support in the pending 
dispute.”208  The opinion notes the importance of Board fact-finding 
in distinguishing genuine concerted activity from contemporaneous, 
apparently similar, but unprotected conduct.209  The bulk of the 
Court’s decision addresses the tenuous connection to the dispute, and 
                                                                                                                                         
 204. See DirecTV, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 25, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Brown, J., 
dissenting) (observing that, since Jefferson Standard, the Board has “gradually 
weakened the very right the Court went out of its way to vindicate”). 
 205. In both MikLin Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 861 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2017) and 
George A. Hormel & Co. v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1992), the court seized 
on prong 2 of the Mountain Shadows test to deny employees the protection of the 
Act. See supra Sections II.C, II.D.3. 
 206. The Supreme Court has apparently recognized the problems arising from the 
call of concerted, yet unprotected, activity. See NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 
U.S. 9, 16–17 (1962) (“[Section 10(c)], of course, cannot mean that an employer is at 
liberty to punish a man by discharging him for engaging in concerted activities which 
[section] 7 of the Act protects.”). 
 207. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. 464, 479 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“On 
this central issue—whether the Court of Appeals rightly or wrongly found that the 
Board applied an improper criterion—this Court is silent.  It does not support the 
Board in using ‘indefensible’ as the legal litmus nor does it reject the Court of 
Appeals’ rejection of that test.  This Court presumably does not disagree with the 
assumption of the Court of Appeals that conduct may be ‘indefensible’ in the 
colloquial meaning of that loose adjective, and yet be within the protection of 
[section] 7.”). 
 208. Id. at 477. 
 209. Id. at 474–75. 
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the Court offered no test for disloyalty to which future panels could 
refer. 
Moreover, the Court’s decision not to remand to the Board, often 
interpreted as giving binding effect to the Court’s disloyalty dicta,210 
just as credibly suggests the reverse.  The reason the majority “found 
no occasion” to remand to the Board was not necessarily, or even 
plausibly, the Court’s silent application of a newly-devised, undefined 
disloyalty standard.  Instead, the most likely explanation is that the 
Board’s own factual conclusion that the attack was “separable” from 
the dispute compelled the result that it was unprotected.  Whether the 
standard for losing protection is ‘unlawfulness,’ ‘indefensibility,’ or 
‘disloyalty,’ the Board could not order reinstatement of an employee 
fired for activity that was never within the scope of section 7.  
Alternatively, the Court’s talk of remanding may be otherwise 
explicable: the Court may have viewed as immaterial the Board’s 
decision on whether third-party appeals were protected at all.211  The 
important point is that the decision not to remand does not have to be 
read as a binding holding on disloyalty. 
On this reading, Jefferson Standard held that where an appeal is 
not sufficiently connected to the dispute such that it is within the 
Act’s protection, the workers responsible remain at-will employees 
subject to discharge “for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad 
cause.”212  One must not forget that, in the absence of a statute to the 
contrary, “an American employer in 1950 had the absolute right to 
discharge an employee for any reason.”213  Although the concept of 
“disloyalty” did play a major role in the Court’s decision, at-will 
employees can be fired for no reason.  The significance of the 
technicians’ ‘disloyalty’ stems from the nature of these cases: because 
                                                                                                                                         
 210. See, e.g., MikLin, 861 F.3d at 820 (“The Supreme Court’s decision not to 
remand in Jefferson Standard made clear that the Court’s disloyalty ruling includes 
communications that otherwise would fall within section 7 protection, if those 
communications ‘mak[e] a sharp, public, disparaging attack upon the quality of the 
company’s product and its business policies, in a manner reasonably calculated to 
harm the company’s reputation and reduce its income.’” (quoting Jefferson Standard, 
346 U.S. at 471)). 
 211. The issue of whether third-party appeals were protected at all was not settled 
until twenty-five years later. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 567 (1978) 
(finding employees do not lose section 7 protection “when they seek to improve 
terms and conditions of employment or otherwise improve their lot as employees 
through channels outside the immediate employee-employer relationship”). 
 212. See Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884). 
 213. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millenium: A 
Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 377 (2002) (emphasis 
added). 
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they arise during labor disputes, the employer claiming that a 
termination was ‘for cause’ will in practice be forced to rebut a 
showing by the Board’s General Counsel that anti-union animus 
played some role in the decision.214  If the employer is unable to point 
to a distinct reason, it cannot meet this burden.  A showing of 
disloyalty is important, but in the sense that it shows what the 
employee was not fired for.215 
E. The Board’s Test Must Respond to the Concerns of the Jefferson 
Standard Court 
The Board is therefore free to discard the unworkable second 
prong of the Mountain Shadows test, which asks whether conduct is 
“so disloyal as to lose the protection of the Act,” when assessing the 
protected status of public appeals for support in a labor dispute.  
Nevertheless, the Board must formulate a test for the “connection” 
prong that responds to the concerns of Congress, as interpreted by 
Jefferson Standard, in enacting section 7 and section 10(c).  The 
Jefferson Standard Court cited Jones & Laughlin’s warning that the 
Board must not “make its authority a pretext for interference with the 
right of discharge.”216  And in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. 
NLRB,217 the Court quoted legislative history explaining that 
section 10(c) was “intended to put an end to the belief, now widely 
held and certainly justified by the Board’s decisions, that engaging in 
union activities carries with it a license to loaf, wander about the 
plants, refuse to work, waste time, break rules, and engage in 
incivilities and other disorders and misconduct.”218  If, then, the 
purpose of 10(c) is to prevent wrongdoers sheltering under the 
protection afforded legitimate concerted activity, it seems unlikely 
that an easily-evaded requirement that an appeal indicate on its face 
some connection to the dispute will suffice.  What is needed is a 
                                                                                                                                         
 214. Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980) (“First, we shall require that 
the [Board’s] General Counsel make a prima facie showing sufficient to support the 
inference that protected conduct was a ‘motivating factor’ in the employer’s decision.  
Once this is established, the burden will shift to the employer to demonstrate that the 
same action would have taken place even in the absence of the protected conduct.”).  
The Supreme Court approved the Board’s approach in NLRB v. Transport. Mgmt. 
Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 404 (1983). 
 215. See BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 14, at 89 (“To demonstrate the illegal basis 
of her termination, an employee effectively needs to disprove any number of possible 
at-will reasons suggested by the employer.”). 
 216. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. 464, 474 (1953). 
 217. 379 U.S. 203 (1964). 
 218. Id. at 217 n.11 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 245, at 42 (1947)). 
2018] BITING THE HAND THAT FEEDS 793 
robust, relation-based test to distinguish protected concerted activity 
from a “separable” attack. 
A better approach to third party appeals would consider the 
connection between the subject-matter of the criticism and that of the 
labor dispute.219  If the criticism would be nullified by successful 
resolution of the dispute, the NLRB should consider it protected.  If 
not, the criticism would be deemed separable from the dispute, and 
thus beyond the reach of the Board’s remedial powers.  Put another 
way, the Board could consider the connection between the dispute 
and the public interest appealed to, asking if the latter would be 
addressed should the employees prevail in the dispute. 
To illustrate the proposed approach, consider MikLin and 
DirecTV.220  In both cases, the outcome would be reversed.  In 
MikLin, the labor dispute was about sick days, and the criticism 
concerned the dangers posed by the employer’s sick day policy.  
Success in the dispute would immediately further the public interest 
in uncontaminated sandwiches.  The criticism attacked a labor policy 
of the company that was the subject of an ongoing labor dispute, and 
the employees had already raised their grievances with management 
itself.  By any measure, this communication was sufficiently related to 
the dispute to be considered as a part of it.  Hence, the sick day poster 
campaign was protected “concerted activit[y] . . . for mutual aid or 
protection,”221 no matter how great—indeed, in proportion to—its 
economic threat to the employer. 
DirecTV is a more difficult case.  At least some of the employees’ 
comments, however, should be considered separable from the labor 
dispute.  Their only connection to the controversy was the 
technicians’ goal that “by the hoped-for financial pressure, the attack 
might extract from the company some future concession.”222  The 
labor dispute was about compensation, but the criticism concerned 
the company’s sales practices.  The employees hoped to exact higher 
wages, but the public interest appealed to was an interest in honest 
salesmen.  The employees could claim a causal connection between 
the compensation policy and the lies—the company told them to lie to 
                                                                                                                                         
 219. Judge Brown, dissenting in DirecTV, suggested the use of this approach 
borrowed from another D.C. Circuit case. See DirecTV, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 25, 
58–59 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Brown, J., dissenting) (citing Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. 
v. NLRB, 113 F.3d 1259, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc)) (“Though technically 
implicating a different line of Supreme Court precedent . . . the court’s analysis 
resonates in both.”). 
 220. See supra Sections II.A–C. 
 221. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 222. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 476–77. 
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do better under the disputed arrangement—and whether this should 
suffice is a question for the Board.  But a rule that includes every 
alleged effect of a challenged labor policy would be overprotective. 
The proposed approach resembles the connection inquiry that 
formed part of the Sierra Publishing ‘reasonableness’ analysis,223 and 
would reach the same result applied to the facts of that case.  The 
employees’ criticism addressed the manner in which the employer 
handled the labor dispute; it was a concern the workers might 
effectively have raised with management; and it would be nullified by 
success in the dispute.  Unlike the approach of the Ninth Circuit, 
though, the proposed approach stops there.  Factors such as harm to 
the employer, malicious intent, or inflammatory style—each of which 
may contribute to the effectiveness of other conduct expressly 
protected by the Act224—would not restrict the right to engage in 
concerted third-party appeals.  Allowing these to count against the 
employee tolerates too great a role for subjective policy preferences 
and imports the prime causes of the present test’s uncertainty. 
The proposed test also resembles, to some extent, the First 
Circuit’s approach in Five Star Transportation Inc. v. NLRB,225 which 
asks whether a criticism “appeared necessary to effectuate the 
employees’ lawful aims.”226  In that case, the Board had carefully 
distinguished between several letters, which “varied widely in content 
and tone,”227 based upon their subject-matter. But this necessity test 
raises the specter of a proportionality analysis—balancing the gain to 
the employee against the harm to the employer—that does no more 
work than the question it seeks to answer: is the conduct “so 
disloyal . . . as to lose the protection of the act?”228  Moreover, a 
requirement that employees show that less harmful (and therefore 
less effective) means had failed, or were likely to fail, would be 
complicated to apply and could prevent employees from taking action 
at the time it would be most effective.  The proposed approach 
requires no such showing. 
                                                                                                                                         
 223. See supra Section II.D.2. 
 224. See supra Section II.E. 
 225. See Five Star Transp., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 F.3d 46, 54–55 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(enforcing reinstatement order where bus drivers’ letters to employer’s employer 
raised primarily employment related concerns because they “were reasonably 
necessary to carry out their lawful aim of safeguarding their then-current 
employment conditions”). 
 226. Id. at 54 (quoting NLRB v. Mount Desert Island Hosp., 695 F.2d 634, 640 (1st 
Cir. 1982)). 
 227. Id. at 49. 
 228. Id. at 52 (quoting Mountain Shadows, 330 N.L.R.B. 1238, 1240 (2000)). 
2018] BITING THE HAND THAT FEEDS 795 
A connection-based approach responds to Congress’s concerns, in 
enacting section 10(c), that legitimate activities could provide cover 
for collateral misconduct.  At the same time, the test acknowledges 
that if employees “are not permitted to address matters that are of 
direct interest to third parties” in publicly criticizing their employer, “ 
it is unlikely that workers’ undisputed right to make third party 
appeals in pursuit of better working conditions would be anything but 
an empty provision.”229  Moreover, because protection is confined to 
criticisms of the employer’s labor practices and their direct 
consequences, the test will tend to exclude criticism of conditions for 
which the employer cannot be held responsible and criticisms that 
interfere with management prerogatives.  Protected appeals should 
work no needless commercial harm. 
Some may object, arguing that the proposed approach takes no 
account of whether employees are acting in good faith.  Indeed, the 
above account of section 10(c)’s animating concerns suggests that 
good faith should really be the key inquiry.  Any test that allows bad 
faith actors to avoid discipline so long as they stay on-message, while 
providing no protection for good faith critics who step slightly out of 
line, might appear deeply flawed. 
The problem with any test that hinges on good or bad faith is that it 
will ultimately be a test of subjective intent.  Although even the 
MikLin majority recognized that subjective intent is “of course 
relevant to the disloyalty inquiry,”230 Sierra Publishing noted that, in 
practice, the employees’ motivation will rarely be discernible.231  And 
to the extent that the tests applied in Sierra Publishing and Five Star 
turned on the intent behind the workers’ criticisms, any effort to 
incorporate such an inquiry into the present approach will struggle 
under the same difficulties as those courts.  A good faith inquiry 
undermines the simplicity of the connection test and reintroduces the 
potential for subjective judgments based on judges’ personal values: 
bad faith is as nebulous a concept as disloyalty, and a test for the 
latter that is grounded in the former will effectively be circular.232 
                                                                                                                                         
 229. Sierra Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 217 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 230. MikLin Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 861 F.3d 812, 821 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 231. Sierra Publ’g, 889 F.2d at 218 n.13 (“How much reliance to place on motive is 
problematic because of the Janus-like nature of legitimate and illegitimate 
intent . . .  It is obvious that most concerted activity could be described in such a way 
as to place it within either characterization.”). 
 232. In fact, “loyalty” and “faith” are synonyms. Loyalty, MERRIAM WEBSTER 
THESAURUS, https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/loyalty [https://perma.cc/
5MHK-HUKU]. 
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F. A Connection-Based Test Is Objective and Can Be More 
Consistently Applied 
The connection-based approach would clarify the law governing 
third-party appeals.  All parties would benefit.  Employees would no 
longer be responsible for monitoring factors that are hard to control 
or measure, such as tone of voice, harm to the employer, or apparent 
intent.  For the employer, the proposed approach would operate 
more predictably than one rooted in the imprecise and subjective 
language of ‘disloyalty.’  Tribunals, meanwhile, will be more 
comfortable with a connection or nexus-based test233—which is within 
judicial competence as ‘disloyalty”’ has never been.234 
Moreover, the suggested reading of Jefferson Standard views the 
case as an interpretation not of section 10(c), but of section 7 only.  
One benefit of this is that it does not implicate the troublesome idea 
that section 10(c) adopted and imported a pre-existing duty of loyalty 
under which a ‘servant’ could not injure his ‘master’s’ business 
interest.  This understanding of Jefferson Standard simplifies the 
question of judicial deference to the Board: defining the scope of 
section 7, courts agree, is for the Board in the first instance.  The 
Chevron analysis is therefore straightforward, no longer demanding 
the gymnastics required to identify the true effect of (i) a Supreme 
Court interpretation of (ii) one section (10(c)) of a federal statute that 
(iii) creates an exception which necessarily also defines the scope of 
another section (section 7) of the same Act. 
CONCLUSION 
The rise of social media has vastly amplified workers’ power to 
express their views before the public and, if handled properly, can 
serve as an effective means of employer-employee communication.  
The potential benefits of enhanced employee voice may not be 
realized if legal uncertainty, or insufficient protection, keeps workers 
silent.  On the other hand, overprotective rules can leave businesses 
                                                                                                                                         
 233. Judges apply connection-based tests in many areas of the law.  For example, in 
tort law, courts may ask whether an employee’s conduct is sufficiently related to his 
duties to support an employer’s vicarious liability.  Other examples include nexus-
based scrutiny of the connection between a statutory scheme and the problem it is 
intended to remedy (constitutional scrutiny), between multiple pieces of language 
(interpretation of contracts, statutes, or the Constitution), and between a cause and 
its purported effect. 
 234. See Ristau, supra note 187, at 920 (arguing that judges should focus on 
detriment, rather than disloyalty, because they are better-equipped to handle the 
more objective standard). 
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exposed to harmful allegations that serve no productive purpose, and 
merely sour relations further. 
In determining the scope of protection afforded third party 
appeals, the Board need not feel constrained by Jefferson Standard to 
withhold the Act’s protection from ‘disloyal' communications.  That 
case should instead be understood as making clear that section 7 
protects activities, not actors, and that conduct “separable” from the 
labor dispute is beyond the reach of the NLRB.  A requirement that 
public criticism bears sufficient connection to the labor dispute would 
enforce the distinction between protected and unprotected conduct 
drawn by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Act. 
A connection-based approach is grounded in the Act’s 
fundamental purpose of promoting industrial peace and economic 
prosperity.  It admits of consistent application and objective 
definition, unlike the elusive disloyalty standard that today confounds 
all parties.  Without a test that clearly separates a worker’s legitimate 
public criticism from “biting the hand that feeds him,” the Act will 
struggle to realize its goals and fulfill its potential. 
 
